29.
In opposition to those things, Titurius exclaimed, "That
they would do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after a junction
with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some
disaster had been received in the neighboring winter-quarters; that the
opportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar had set forth into Italy, as the
Carnutes would not otherwise have taken the measure of slaying
Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had been
present, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he did not
regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine
was near; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous
victories were subjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after
having received so many defeats she was reduced under the sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters
being extinguished." Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this, that
Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure
grounds? That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing very
formidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul conspired with the Germans, their
only safety lay in dispatch. What issue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if
immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a protracted
siege, was."
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